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Abstract 
This paper presents a decision-theoretic ap­
proach to statistical inference that satisfies 
the Likelihood Principle (LP) without using 
prior information. Unlike the Bayesian ap­
proach, which also satisfies LP, we do not 
assume knowledge of the prior distribution 
of the unknown parameter. With respect to 
information that can be obtained from an ex­
periment, our solution is more efficient than 
Wald's minimax solution. However, with re­
spect to information assumed to be known 
before the experiment, our solution demands 
less input than the Bayesian solution. 
1 Introduction 
The Likelihood Principle (LP) is one of the funda­
mental principles of statistical inference [8, 5, 3, 2]. 
A statistical inference problem can be formulated as 
follows. We are given a description of an experiment 
in the form of a partially specified probability model 
that consists of a random variable Y which is as­
sumed to follow one of the distributions in the family 
:F = {PolO E !1}. The set of distributions is param­
eterized by (I whose space is !1. Suppose we observe 
Y = y, an outcome of the experiment. What can we 
conclude about the true value of the parameter (I?. 
Roughly speaking, LP holds that all relevant informa­
tion from the situation is encoded in the likelihood 
function on the parameter space. In practice, likeli­
hood information is used according to the maximum 
likelihood procedure (also refered to as the maximum 
likelihood principle or method) whereby the likelihood 
assigned to a set of hypotheses is often taken to be the 
maximum of the likelihoods of individual hypothesis 
in the set. The power and importance of this pro­
cedure in statistics is testified by the following quote 
from Lehman [14]: 
Although the maximum likelihood principle 
is not based on any clearly defined optimum 
consideration, it has been very successful in 
leading to satisfactory procedures in many 
specific problems. For wide classes of prob­
lem, maximum likelihood procedure have also 
been shown to possess various asymptotic op­
timum properties as the sample size tends to 
infinity. 
A major approach to statistical inference is the 
decision-theoretic approach in which the statistical in­
ference problem is viewed as a decision problem un­
der uncertainty. This view implies that every action 
taken about the unknown parameter has consequences 
depending on the true value of the parameter. For ex­
ample, in the context of an estimation problem, an 
action can be understood as the estimate of the pa­
rameter; or in the context of a hypothesis testing prob­
lem an action is a decision to accept or reject an hy­
pothesis. The consequences of actions are valued by 
their utility or loss. A solution to a decision problem 
is selected according to certain theories. Two widely 
used decision theories are Wald's minimax and the 
expected utility maximization. The latter is appropri­
ate for Bayesian statistical problems in which there is 
sufficient information to describe the posterior proba­
bility distribution on the hypothesis space. Bayesian 
approach agrees with LP. It holds that the relevant 
information from the experiment is indeed contained 
in the likelihood function. However, in addition to the 
experimental data, Bayesian statistics assumes the ex­
istence of a prior probability distribution, which sum­
marizes the information about the unknown parameter 
before the experiment is conducted. This prior prob­
ability assumption is probably the most contentious 
topic in statistics. 
In [10, 11], we presented an axiomatic approach to de­
cision making where uncertainty about the true state 
of nature is expressed by a possibility function. Possi­
bility theory is a relatively recent calculus for describ-
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ing uncertainty. Possibility theory has been developed 
and used mostly within the AI community. It was first 
proposed in late 1970s by Zadeh [23]. 
In this paper, we take the position of LP. In particular, 
we assume that likelihood information, as used in the 
maximum likelihood procedure, faithfully represents 
all relevant uncertainty about the unknown parame­
ter. We show that such information is a possibility 
measure. Thus, our decision theory for possibility cal­
culus is applicable to the problem of statistical infer­
ence. We argue that our approach satisfies LP. But, 
in contrast with the Bayesian approach, we do not as­
sume any knowledge of the prior distribution of the 
unknown parameter. We claim that our solution is 
more information efficient than Wald 's minimax solu­
tion, but demands less input than the Bayesian solu­
tion. 
2 Likelihood Information and 
Possibility Function 
Let us recall basic definitions in possibility theory. A 
possibility function is a mapping from the set of pos­
sible worlds S to the unit interval [0, 1] 
1r: S-+ [0, 1] such that max1r(w) = 1 (1) wES 
Possibility for a subset A <;; S is defined as 
1r(A) = maX7r(w) (2) 
wE A 
A conditional possibility1 is defined for A, B C 
S, 1r(A) f. 0 
1r(B[A) = 1r(:(
�
)
B) 
(3) 
Compared to probability functions, the major differ­
ence is that the possibility of a set is the maximum of 
possibilities of elements in the set. 
Given a probabilistic model :F and an observation y, 
we want to make inference about the unknown param­
eter e which is in space !1. 
The likelihood concept used in modern statistics was 
coined by R. A. F isher who mentioned it as early as 
1922 [9]. Fisher used likelihood to measure the "men­
tal confidence" in competing scientific hypotheses as a 
result of a statistical experiment (see [8] for a detailed 
account). Likelihood has a puzzling nature. For a 
single value e0, the likelihood is just Pe0 (y), the prob­
ability of observing y if e0 is in fact the true value of 
1There are two definitions of conditioning in possibil­
ity theory. One that is frequently found in possibility lit­
erature is called ordinal conditioning. The definition we 
use here is called numerical conditioning. See [7] for more 
details. 
the parameter. One can write Pe0(y) in the form of a 
conditional probability: P(Y = y[e = eo). The latter 
notation implies that there is a probability measure on 
parameter space !1. This is the case for the Bayesian 
approach. In this paper, we do not assume such a 
probability measure. So we will stick with the former 
notation. For each value e E !1, there is a likelihood 
quantity. If we view the set of likelihood quantities as 
a function on the parameter space, we have a likeli­
hood function. To emphasis the fact that a likelihood 
function is tied to data y and has e as the variable, 
the following notation is often used: 
liky(e) = Pe(y) (4) 
Thus, a likelihood function is determined by a partially 
specified probabilistic model and an observation. It is 
important to note that the likelihood function can no 
longer can be interpreted as a probability function. For 
example, integration (or summation) of the likelihood 
function over the parameter space, in general, does not 
sum up to unity. 
The Likelihood Principle (LP) states that all informa­
tion about e that can be obtained from an observation 
y is contained in the likelihood function for e given y, 
up to a proportional constant. LP has two powerful 
supporting arguments [3]. 
F irst, it is well known that likelihood function liky (e) 
is a minimal sufficient statistic for e. Thus, from the 
classical statistical point of view, the likelihood con­
tains all information about e. Second, Birnbaum, in 
a seminal article published in 1962 [4], showed that 
the Likelihood Principle is logically equivalent to the 
combination of two fundamental principles in statis­
tics: the principle of conditionality and the principle 
of sufficiency. The principle of conditionality says that 
only the actual observation is relevant to the analysis 
and not those that potentially could be observed. The 
principle of sufficiency says that in the context of a 
given probabilistic model, a sufficient statistic contains 
all relevant information about the parameter that can 
be obtained from data. 
Let us define an "extended" likelihood function Liky : 
2n -+ [0, 1] as follows: 
del 
del 
Ziky (e) Ziky (e) 
liky ( 0) 
sup Liky(w) for A<;; !1 
wE A 
where e is a maximum likelihood estimate of e. 
(5) 
(6) 
The "extended" likelihood is not new. In fact, it was 
used by Neyman and Pearson in seminal papers pub­
lished in 1928 [18] where their famous hypothesis test-
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ing theory was presented. The idea is to use the max­
imum likelihood estimate as the proxy for a set. Such 
a procedure is not only intuitively appealing, but it is 
also backed by various asymptotic optimality proper­
ties [ 13, 15, 19]. 
If in the process, one decides to focus on a particular 
subset of the parameter space B <;:: !1, the effect of 
refocusing on the extended likelihood function could 
be express through what we call conditioning. 
lik (AlB) �� liky(A n B) y 
liky(B) 
(7) 
We have a theorem whose proof consists of just veri­
fying that the function Iliky satisfies the axioms of a 
possibility measure listed in eqs (1, 2, 3). 
Theorem 1 The extended likelihood function liky is 
a possibility function. 
This technically obvious theorem is important because 
it establishes a direct link between possibility theory 
and the central concept in statistics. This relation­
ship has been noticed for quite some time. The fact 
that the posterior possibility function calculated from 
a vacuous prior possibility and a random observation 
behaves as a likelihood function has been pointed out 
by Smets [21] if the updating process is required to 
satisfy certain postulates. Dubois et a!. [6] show that 
possibility measures can be viewed as the supremum 
of a family of likelihood functions. Based on that they 
justify the min combination rule for possibility func­
tions. We argue further that all relevant information 
about the unknown parameter that can be obtained 
from a partially specified probability model and an ob­
servation is a possibility measure. This view is essen­
tially Shafer's idea [20] according to which statistical 
evidence is coded by belief functions whose focal ele­
ments are nested. This kind of belief function ( conso­
nant) in its plausibility form is a possibility function. 
Halpern and Fagin [12] argue for the representation 
of evidence by a discrete probability function that is 
obtained by normalizing likelihoods of the singletons 
so that they sum to unity. However, this probability, 
Halpern and Fagin concede, should be interpreted in 
neither frequentist nor subjectivist senses. 
The identity of likelihood and possibility can be used 
in two directions. First, for possibility theory and its 
application in AI, the link with statistics boosts its rel­
evance and validity. We argue that unlike the Bayesian 
approach, which assumes a completely specified distri­
bution, the possibility function is the result of a par­
tially specified model (true distribution is unknown 
but assumed to be in a :F) and an observed data. In 
other words, we have answered the question which is 
Lik 
Figure 1: A Likelihood for Y = 1.4 
often raised in discussions: "Where does possibility in­
formation come from?" One answer is it comes from a 
partially specified probability model of a phenomenon 
and experimental observations. The derived possibil­
ity function encodes all relevant information that can 
be obtained from the experiment. Second, statistics 
can also benefit from recently developed techniques in 
an area that has a different motivation. Traditional 
problems in statistics may be re-examined in the light 
of new insights. In the rest of this paper, we study the 
statistical decision problem from the point of view of 
qualitative decision theory as described in [10, 11]. 
Example: A random variable Y is known to have 
a normal distribution. It is also known that mean 
p, E {0, 1} and standard deviation cr E {1, 1.5}. Sup­
pose that value y = 1.4 is observed. Construct an 
extended likelihood function representing information 
about unknown parameters of distribution of Y. 
Parameter() =  (p,,cr). n = {wl, w2, w3,w4} with W} = 
(0, 1), W2 = (0, 1.5), W3 = (1, 1), W4 = (1, 1.5). 
W! W2 W3 w4 
lik1.4 (.) 0.1497 0.1720 0.3683 0.2567 
lik1.4 (.) 0.4066 0.4672 1.0 0.6970 
Events lik1.4(.) 
p, = 0 or {w1, w2} 0.4672 
p, = 1 or {w3, w4} 1. 
cr = 1 or {w1, w3} 1. 
cr = 1.5 or { w2, w4} 0.6970 
11 = Olcr = 1 0.4066 
p, = 1lcr = 1 1.0 
p, = Olcr = 1.5 0.6703 
11 = 1lcr = 1.5 1.0 
3 A Decision Theory with Likelihood 
Information Only 
Let us review, in terms of likelihood semantics, our 
proposal for qualitative decision making with possibil­
ity theory [10, 11]. We assume a situation that includes 
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a set !1 which can be interpreted as the set of hypothe­
ses or the parameter space. Also assumed is a set of 
consequences or prizes X that includes one best prize 
(x) and one worst prize (.:..). An action d is a mapping 
!1-+ X. In other words, the consequence of an action 
is determined by which hypothesis is true. The set of 
actions is denoted by A. The uncertainty about hy­
potheses obtained from the observation is expressed by 
an extended likelihood function 1r. An action coupled 
with a uncertainty measure determines a simple lot­
tery. Each lottery is a mechanism that delivers prizes 
with associated likelihoods. Formally, a lottery L in­
duced by 7r and dis a mapping from X -+ [0, I] such 
that L(x) = 7r(d-1(x)) for x E X where d-1 is a 
set-valued inverse mapping of action d. For the re­
mainder of this paper, we will denote a simple lottery 
by [L(x1)/x1, L(x2)/x2, ... ] with the convention that 
those Xj for which L(xj) = 0 are omitted. If we let 
prizes to be lotteries then we have compound lotteries. 
If a lottery involves only two prizes x and .;!;. (the best 
and the worst) as potential outcomes then it is called 
a canonical lottery. The set of canonical lotteries is 
denoted by Cc. 
We study a preference relation t on the set of lotteries 
C. We postulate that t satisfies five axioms similar to 
those proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern for 
the classical linear utility theory (in the form presented 
in [I7]). They are as follows. 
(AI) Order. t is reflexive, transitive, complete. 
(A2) Reduction of compound lotteries. 
Let L = [tid L1, tid L2 ... tik/ Lk] and L; = 
[��:;dx1, ��:;2/x2, ... ��:;r/xr] then L � L8 where 
Ls = [��:dx1, ��:dx2, ... ll:r/Xr] with 
(A3) Substitutability. 
If L; � L; then [tid £1, ... tid L; . . .  tik/ Lk] 
[tid £1, ... tid L; ... tik/ Lk] 
(8) 
(A4) Continuity. For each x; E X there is a s E Cc 
such that x; � s. 
(A5) Qualitative monotonicity. 
[>./x, J.L/&] t [.>.' /x, J.L' 1 .ili.] iff (.>. � >.')&(J.L ::; J.L') 
(9) 
In [10, 11] we prove a representation theorem for the 
preference relation. 
Theorem 2 t on C satisfies axioms Al to AS if and 
only if it is represented by a unique utility function QU 
such that 
where function QU is a mapping C -+ U where U = 
{(u,v)lu,v E [O,IJ and max(u,v) = 1}. The binary 
utility scale is formed by defining an order � on U as 
follows 
{ (I � .\ � .\' & J.L = p/ = I) V 
(.\,J.!) � (.\1,J.!1) iff (.\=I & .\1 <I) v 
(.\=A' = I & J.!::; J.!') 
Multiplication and maximization are extended to pairs 
as follows (a, /3, /,�are scalar). 
a.(/3, !) 
max{(a,f)), (J,W 
def 
(a.f), a.1) 
def ((, 1)) 
where(,= max{a,/} and 1) = max{/3,0 
(11) 
(I2) 
The expression in the right-hand side of eq.(IO) is 
called the qualitative expected utility of the lottery in 
the left-hand side. As a result of theorem 2, we can 
compare the preference of lotteries by looking at their 
expected utility. 
These five axioms were justified on intuitive grounds 
in [10, 11]. As we argued, the uncertainty information 
about the unknown parameter resulting from an ex­
periment is captured by a possibility measure. Thus, 
the axioms can be justified indirectly in the context 
of statistical inference problem. However, we think it 
would be useful to reexamine them directly in terms 
of likelihood here. 
Among the axioms, AI and A3 are standard assump­
tions about a preference relation. 
A2 is an implication of the conditioning operation. 
Suppose that the unknown parameter e is a vector. 
We can think, for example, e = (!,a). Let us consider 
a compound lottery L = [7rl/L1,7r2/L2,···,7rk/Lk] 
where L; = [��:;dx1, ... , ll:;r/Xr] for I ::; i ::; k. Under­
lying L, in fact, is a two-stage lottery. The first stage is 
associated with a scalar parameter /· It accepts values 
11, 12, .. ·lk with likelihoods 1!"1, 7r2, ... 1fk respectively. 
If /i is the true value, the holder of L is rewarded 
with simple lottery L; that, in turn, is associated with 
scalar parameter a that accepts a0,(1),ao,(2),···ao,(r) 
with likelihoods 11:;1, 11:;2, ... ll:ir where o; is a permuta­
tion of (I, 2, 3, . . . r) . When ao,(j) obtains, the holder is 
rewarded with prize Xj· We can view this lottery from 
a different angle. That is Lis a lottery that delivers Xj 
in case tuple < !;ao,(i) > is the true value of e. Thus, 
the extended likelihood < /iO"o,(j) > is 7r;.ll:ij since ll:ij 
is the conditional likelihood on /i. The set of tuples 
for which Xj is delivered is { < /iao,(j) > II::; i::; k}. 
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Figure 2: Binary utility from observation 
Thus, the extended likelihood associated with prize Xj 
in lottery Lis max{7r;.K;jj1::; i::; k}. 
The continuity axiom (A4) requires that for any con­
sequence x E X there is a canonical lottery c = 
(>.J/x, >.2/!f.) such that x � c. For clarity, let us as­
sume that x == 1, !f.== 0. For any x E [0, 1], we need 
to find a canonical lottery c equivalent to x. We pro­
pose a likelihood gamble for that purpose. By doing 
so, we provide an operational semantic for the concept 
of binary utility. 
Suppose that random variable Y is generated from one 
of two normal distributions2 that have the same stan­
dard deviation 0' = 1 but with two different means, ei­
ther -1 or 1, i.e., Y � N(-1, 1) or Y � N(1, 1). Next 
you are informed that a randomly observed value of Y 
is y. What is the most you would be willing to pay for 
a gamble that pays $1 if the true mean J.l is -1 and 
nothing if the true mean is 1? If the answer is x, then 
it can be shown that for you 
X� [Liky(-1)/1, Liky(1)j0j (13) 
Figure 2 plots functions >.1 (y) = Liky ( -1) (the dashed 
line) and >.2(y) = Liky(1). 
This betting procedure is quite similar to the test used 
in practice to identify the unary utility of a monetary 
value. But there are important differences. First, in­
stead of using a random variable with a known distri­
bution (e.g., tossing a fair coin or rolling a dice), we use 
for our test a partially specified model together with 
a randomly generated observation. We let the deci­
sion maker bet on a gamble tied to a situation that by 
nature, is a hypothesis testing problem. The rewards 
in this gamble are tied not to an observed realization 
of the random variable as in an ordinary gamble, but 
instead, the rewards are conditioned on the true value 
of the parameter underlying the random variable. 
2The use of normal distributions is for illustration pur­
pose only. Any other distribution will do. 
We just showed that binary utility elicitation is done 
by betting on a likelihood gamble. We assume that 
the betting behavior of the decision maker is consistent 
and rational in some way. For example, paying $0.20 
for the gamble if Y == -3 and paying $0.70 if Y == 
1 is considered irrational. The constraint we impose 
is formulated as axiom A5, qualitative monotonicity 
(x == 1 and !f. == 0). In other words, we require that 
the price for the lottery [>./1, J.L/0] is no less than the 
price for [>.' /1, J.L1 /OJ if the condition on the right hand 
of eq. ( 9) is satisfied. 
Since the likelihood gamble, as noted, is a hypothesis 
testing problem. We show that axiom A5 is supported 
by the traditional statistical inference methods namely 
classical, Bayesian and likelihood. Let us denote by y 
and y' the values of Y that associate with gambles 
[>./1, J.L/0] and [>.' /1, J.L1 /0] respectively. Referring to 
the graphs in figure 2, it is easy to check the fact that 
the condition on the right hand of eq.(9) is equivalent 
to y ::; y'. We want to show that the confidence in 
favor of J.l == -1 is higher for y than for y' no matter 
which methods arc used. 
For the significance test method applied for testing 
J.l = 1 against J.l = -1, the p-value for rejecting J.l == 1 
in favor of J.l == -1 provided by data y is Pi<=I(Y ::0 y) 
that is smaller than the p-valuc corresponding to data 
y' which is Pf'=l (Y ::0 y'). 
The likelihood reasoning [8] compares the hypotheses 
by looking at their likelihood ratios. It is obvious that 
liky( -1) > liky'( -1) 
liky(1) - liky'(1) 
(14) 
If the decision maker is Bayesian and assumes the prior 
probability P(J.L = -1) == p, then (s)he will calculate 
posterior probabilities 
p.Liky(-1) 
( ) P(J.L = -1jy) == 
p.Liky(-1) + (1- p).Liky(1) 
15 
From Liky(-1) 2': Liky'(-1) and Liky(1) ::; Liky'(1), 
we have P(J.L == -1jy) 2': P(J.L = -1jy'). Let us denote 
the expected payoffs of the likelihood gambles in two 
cases Y == y and Y == y' by Vy and Vy'. Vy == P(J.L == 
-1jy).1 + P(J.L == 1jy).O == P(J.L == -1jy) 2': P(J.L = 
-1jy') == Vy'· 
We want to invoke one more, in our opinion the most 
important, justification for A5. This justification is 
based on the concept of the first order stochastic dom­
inance (FSD). 
Without being a strict Bayesian, we do not assume 
to know the prior probability of P(J.L == -1). We can 
model this situation by viewing the prior probability 
of J.l == -1 as a random variable p taking value in the 
-; 
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Exp. payoff 
Figure 3: Expected payoffs for two observations 
unit interval. However, we do not assume to know the 
distribution of p. We will write the expected payoff of 
the likelihood gamble by Vy(p). Since it is a function 
of p, Vy(p) is a random variable. We want to compare 
two r.v. Vy(p) and Vy'(p). 
One of the methods used for comparing random vari­
ables is based on the concept of stochastic dominance 
(SD). We are interested in the first degree stochastic 
dominance (FSD). This concept has been used exten­
sively in economics, finance, statistics and other ar­
eas [16]. Suppose X and Y are two distinct random 
variables with the cumulative distributions F and G 
respectively. We say that X stochastically dominates 
(first degree) Y (write XD1Y) iff F (x) :s; G(x) Vx. 
Since X and Y are distinct, strict inequality must hold 
for at least one value x. FSD is important because 
of the following equivalence XD1Y iff E(u(X)) :::: 
E(u(Y)) VuE U where U the class of non-decreasing 
utility functions. E( u(X)) is the expected utility of X 
under utility function u. 
Let us consider the relation between Vy (p) and Vy' (p). 
We have the following lemma that relates the expected 
payoffs and the likelihood pairs. The proof is omitted. 
Lemma 1 For a given value p rf_ {0, 1}, Vy(p) > 
Vy' (p) iff 
(Liky(-1),Liky(1)) > (Liky'(-1),Liky'(1)) (16) 
In figure 3, the lower curve is the graph for Vo.6o (p) (at 
Y 
= .6 the extended likelihood pair is (.3011, 1.)) and 
the upper curve is the graph for Vo.26(P) ( (.5945, 1.) ). 
Now, for any v E (0, 1), let us denote the roots of 
equations Vy (p) = v and Vy' (p) = v by Pv and p� re­
spectively i.e., Vy(Pv) = v and Vy' (p�) = v. If (>.., Jt) > 
( >..', Jt1) then by lemma 1 Vy (Pv) > Vy' (Pv). Therefore, 
Vy' (p�) > Vy' (Pv). Because Vy' (p) is strictly increas­
ing, we infer Pv < p�. 
Since Vy(p) and Vy'(P) are increasing, P(Vy(p) :s; v) = 
P(p :s; Pv) and P(Vy'(P) :s; v) = P(p :s; p�). Because 
Pv < p�, P(Vy(p) :s; v) :s; P(Vy'(P) :s; v) . This last 
inequality means Vy(p) D1 Vy'(p). Thus, we have the 
following theorem 
Theorem 3 The order on binary utility is the order 
oj first degree stochastic dominance. 
In summary, we show that there are compelling argu­
ments justifying the five proposed axioms. 
4 A Decision-Theoretic Approach to 
Statistical Inference with Likelihood 
We will review the decision theoretic approach to sta­
tistical inference. We assume given the set of alterna­
tive actions denoted by A, the sample space of Y by 
Y. A loss L(a, IJ) measures the loss that arises if we 
take action a and the true value of the parameter is IJ. 
A decision rule is a mapping 15 : Y -t A, that is for an 
observation y the rule recommends an action 15(y). The 
risk function of a decision rule 15 at parameter value IJ 
is defined as 
R(15(Y), IJ) � EoL(15(Y), IJ) = h L(l5(y), O)po(y) 
(17) 
The risk function measures the average loss by adopt­
ing the rule 15 in case IJ is the true value. 
The further use of risk functions depends on how much 
information we assume is available. For each point in 
the parameter space, there is a value of risk function. 
In case no a priori information about parameter exists, 
Wald [22] advocated the use of minimax rule which 
minimizes the worst risk that could be attained by a 
rule. 
15* = arg min max R( 15, IJ) 6E.:l. 0Ef! (18) 
where .6. is the set of decision rules. 15* is called the 
minimax solution. 
If we assume, as the Bayesian school does, the exis­
tence of a prior distribution of the parameter then the 
risk could be averaged out to one number called Bayes 
risk 
r(/5) = EpR(/5, IJ) (19) 
where p is prior distribution of (). Then the optimal 
rule is one that minimizes the Bayes risk which is called 
the Bayes solution. 
Wald [22] pointed out the relationship between the two 
rules. There exists a prior distribution p called "the 
least favorable" for which Bayes solution is the mini­
max solution. 
In our view, both solution concepts are not entirely 
satisfactory. Bayes solution is made possible by assum­
ing the existence of prior distribution, which is often 
a leap of faith. Although in highly idealized situation, 
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prior probability may be extracted from preference or 
betting behavior, in practice, there are many factors 
that violate conditions necessary for such deduction. 
We have two problems with Wald's proposal. First, 
the risk function has no special role for the actually 
observed data. Thus, Wald's proposal does not respect 
the principle of conditionality. That violation leads to 
the second problem of minimax rule. The rule ignores 
information about the parameter that is obtained from 
the data. One can argue that the minimax rule is 
being cautious. But it is, in our opinion, too cautious. 
There is information about the parameter () provided 
by the observed data, namely, likelihood information, 
that must be utilized in making a decision. 
We propose the following solution. For a given y E 
Y, an extended likelihood function liky is calculated. 
That allows comparison of actions on the basis of their 
qualitative expected utilities, or more exactly, utilities 
of lotteries induced by the actions and the likelihood 
function. For an action d and an observation y, denote 
Ld(Y) the lottery generated. The selected action given 
observation y is 
d*(y) = arg sup QU(Ld(y)) 
dE A 
(20) 
where sup3 is the operation taking maximum element 
according to the binary order. Equation (20) also de­
fines a decision rule in the sense that for each point 
in the sample space, it gives an action. We call such 
a decision rule the likelihood solution for obvious rea-
sons. 
5 An Illustrative Example 
The following example is adapted from [1]. The manu­
facturer of small travel clocks which are sold through a 
chain of department stores agrees to service any clock 
once only if it fails to operate satisfactorily in the first 
year of purchase. For any clock, a decision must be 
made on whether to merely clean it or replace the 
works, i.e., the set of actions A= {a1, a2} where a1 de­
notes cleaning the clock, and a2 denotes immediately 
replacing the works. 
Let us assume that there are only two possible faults 
i.e., n = {B1,B2} where ()1 means there is the need for 
cleaning and ()2 means the clock has been physically 
damaged and the works need replacement. Utility and 
loss functions are given in the following table. The re­
lationship between utility and loss is through equation 
Loss = 1 -Utility. 
3In contrast to max defined in eq. 12 that operates on 
scalars. 
u(a, B) B1 B2 
a1 .8 .3 
a2 .5 .5 
L(a,B) B1 B2 
a1 .2 .7 
a2 .5 .5 
The loss table is roughly estimated from the fact that 
cleaning a clock costs $0.20 and replacing the works 
costs $0.50. If the policy is to replace the works for 
every clock needing service then the cost is $0.50 no 
matter which problem is present. If the policy is to 
clean a clock first, if the state is B1 then the service 
costs $0.20, however in the case of physical damage 
then cleaning alone obviously does not fix the problem 
and the manufacturer ends up replacing the works also. 
Thus the total cost is $0. 70. 
The manufacturer can ask the customer to provide a 
symptom of malfunction when a clock is sent to the 
service center. The symptom can be viewed as ob­
servation. Assume the sample space Y = {Yl, Y2, Y3} 
where y1 means "the clock has stopped operating", Y2 -
"the clock is erratic in timekeeping and y3 - "clock can 
only run for a limited period". Such information gives 
some indication about () that is expressed in terms of 
likelihood 
Y1 Y2 Y3 
.1 .4 .5 
.7 .2 . 1  
For each point in the sample space, you can either 
choose a1 or a2, so there are 8 possible decision rules 
in total. Each decision rule specifies an action given 
an observation. 
ol 02 o3 04 05 06 07 as 
Y1 a! a! al al a2 a2 a2 a2 
Y2 a! a! a2 az a1 al az az 
Y3 a! a2 al az a1 az a! az 
We calculate the risk function values for each rule and 
parameter value in the following table 
.2 
.7 
.35 
.68 
.32 
.66 
.47 .23 
.64 .56 
.38 .35 
.54 .52 
.50 
.50 
Notice that there is no rule which is superior to all 
other for both values of B. Wald's minimax solution is 
as. 
If we assume prior distribution of() then we can calcu­
late the Bayes risks for the rules. For example if prior 
probability p(B1) = .7, then Bayes risks r.1(oi) are 
.35 .449 .442 .541 .329 .428 .401 .50 
In this case, the Bayes solution is o5. It is easy to 
understand why the Bayes solution will be different if 
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the prior p( 111) changes. Indeed, a sensitivity analysis 
shows that Bayes solution is 
Bayes solution When 
p( Ill) 2: .824 
.250 :S p( Ill) :S .824 
. 118 :Sp(lil) :S .250 
p( Ill) :S .118 
In our approach, suppose the betting procedure pro­
duces the following preference equivalence between 
monetary values and binary utility. 
Unary utility Binary utility 
.8 
.5 
.3 
(1, .25) 
(1, 1) 
(.43, 1) 
Given observation y1, the extended likelihood function 
is Liky, (111) = .14 and Liky, (112) = 1. Action a1 is as­
sociated with lottery La1 (Yl) = [.14/ (1, .25), 1/ (.43, 1)] 
whose qualitative expected utility is calculated as 
max{.14(1, .25), 1(.43, 1)} 
max{ (. 14, .035), (.43, 1)} 
(.43, 1) 
Action a2 is associated with lottery La, (Yl) 
[.14/( 1, 1), 1/( 1, 1 )] whose qualitative expected util­
ity QU(La2(y1)) = ( 1, 1 ). Thus, given Yl, we have 
a2 >-y, a1 i.e., a2 is strictly prefered to a1. 
Given observation y2, the extended likelihood function 
is Liky2(1il) = 1 and Liky2(1i2) = .5. We calculate the 
qualitative expected utility for a1 is QU( La, (y2)) = 
(1, .5) and for a2 QU(La,(Y2)) = (1, 1). Thus, a1 >-y2 
a2. 
Given observation y3, the extended likelihood function 
is Liky2(111) = 1 and Liky2(82) = .2. The qualitatively 
expected utility for a1 is QU(La, (y3)) = ( 1, .25) and 
for a2 remains QU(La2(y3)) = (1, 1). Thus, a1 >-y, a2. 
In summary, our approach suggests c55 as the likelihood 
solution. 
Let us make an informal comparison of likelihood so­
lution with minimax and Bayes solutions. In this ex­
ample, likelihood solution c55 is different from the min­
imax solution c58. It is because, as we noted, minimax 
solution ignores the uncertainty generated by an ob­
servation while likelihood solution does not. In that 
sense, likelihood solution is more information efficient. 
If the prior probability p(li1) = .7, then the Bayes so­
lution is c55 the same as the likelihood solution. If prior 
probability is available, one can argue that Bayes so­
lution is the optimal one. However, the "optimality" 
of Bayes solution comes at a cost. The decision maker 
must possess the prior probability. This condition can 
be satisfied either at some monetary cost (doing re­
search, or buying from those who know) or the deci­
sion maker can just assume some prior distribution. 
In the latter case, the cost is a compromise of solution 
optimality. One can extend the concept of Bayes solu­
tion to include the sensitivity analysis. This certainly 
helps decision maker by providing a frame of reference. 
But sensitivity analysis itself does not constitute any 
basis for knowing the prior probability. 
The fact that likelihood solution c55 coincides with 
Bayes solution that corresponds to a largest interval 
of prior should not be exaggerated. Different unary­
binary utility conversions may lead to different likeli­
hood solution. However, it is important to note that 
there is a fundamental reason for the agreement. As 
we have pointed out, the axioms A 1  to A5 on which 
likelihood solution is based, are structurally similar 
to those in [ 17]. In that work, Luce and Raiffa used 
those axioms to justify linear utility concept which ul­
timately is a basis for Bayes solution. Thus, at a foun­
dational level, optimality of likelihood solution could 
be justified in the same way as the optimality for Bayes 
solution although the two optimality concepts are ob­
viously different. We argue that the question of which 
optimality has precedence over the other depends on 
how much information is available. 
6 Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper, we take the fundamental position that 
all relevant information about the unknown parameter 
is captured by the likelihood function. This position 
is justified on the basis of the Likelihood Principle and 
various asymptotic optimality properties of the maxi­
mum likelihood procedure. We show that such a like­
lihood function is basically a possibility measure. 
We re-examine the axioms of our decision theory with 
possibility calculus in terms of the likelihood seman­
tics. We provide a betting procedure that determines, 
for a decision maker, the binary utility of a monetary 
value. This test justifies the continuity axiom. We also 
justify the monotonicity axiom A5 in terms of first or­
der stochastic dominance. 
We propose a new likelihood solution to a statistical 
decision problem. The solution is based on maximiz­
ing the qualitative expected utility of an action given 
the likelihood function associated with a point in the 
sample space. The likelihood solution is sandwiched 
by Wald's minimax solution on one side and the Bayes 
solution on the other side. Compared to the minimax 
solution, the likelihood solution is more information 
efficient. Compared to the Bayesian solution, the like­
lihood solution does not require a prior probability dis-
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tribution of the unknown parameter. 
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